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Abstract 
 
Texas Disaster Recovery Capacity: the impacts of leadership structures 
on local resilience 
 
Nicole Marie Joslin, MSCRP 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2014 
 
Supervisor:  Barbara Brown Wilson 
 
This report examines the leadership structures of four disaster recovery housing 
programs in two Texas communities in order to identify leadership models that contribute 
to future individual and community resilience. Disaster recovery is a physical and social 
process that requires both scientific knowledge of best practices and practical local 
knowledge of community context. The level of a community’s physical, organizational, 
and social capacity relates directly to its ability to deliver needed disaster recovery 
services. The variation of capacity at all levels of governmental agencies and community 
organizations across Texas has become dramatically apparent over the last decade of 
disasters with clear consequences to the success of disaster recovery efforts.  
Information collected from those involved in the housing recovery efforts from 
two recent disasters in Texas, Hurricane Dolly in 2008 and the Bastrop Complex 
Wildfires in 2011, provide a window into the current governance models being 
employed. Communities in the Rio Grande Valley and Bastrop County are now 
administering multiple housing recovery efforts through assorted levels of government 
 vi 
and community organization. By documenting and analyzing the structure of leadership 
in each program through quantitative and qualitative methods this report reconstructs the 
capacities of each leadership model that are relevant to articulated recovery goals.  
Findings from this analysis reveal opportunities for improvement in the design of future 
disaster recovery programs at the state and local level.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1   DISASTER VULNERABILITIES IN TEXAS 
Disasters are understood as disruptions in daily life that occur when our physical 
environment (exposure to hazardous conditions), social environment (vulnerable social 
and demographic characteristics), and the constructed environment (buildings and 
development patterns) conflict (Mileti, 1999). Disaster vulnerability is determined by 
exposure to risk in these environments which is largely a reflection of the power relations 
operating in that particular time and place (Bankoff, 2004). Though these delicate 
environments are ever changing, the concentrated risks experienced in some geographic 
areas and by select social groups are predictable and enduring.  
Texas has a considerable amount of physical vulnerabilities when it comes to 
natural hazards. The state’s roughly 350 miles of coastline are constantly threatened by 
tropical storms, hurricanes, and sea level rise.1 Parts of North Texas have experienced a 
number of devastating tornados2 over the years and communities across the state have 
seen the destructive effects of flash floods3. A devastating drought4 has crept its way 
across the state breeding prime conditions for wildfires5. Texas is also home to numerous 
                                                
1 Researchers at Texas A&M’s Center for Texas Beaches and Shores warn that continued development 
along coastal areas expose populations to more risk and alter the natural functions and habitats of the 
shoreline (Bertrand, 2014) 
2 The cities of Lubbock, Dallas, San Antonio, and Houston combined have experienced over 450 tornados 
since 1950 (Forbes, 2005).  
3 The Flood Safety Education Project produced this short animation explaining Texas’ unique flash flood 
risks: http://floodsafety.com/media/interactives/texaschallenge/index.htm (Flood Safety Education Project, 
n.d.). 
4 See http://droughtmonitor.unl.edu/data/pdfs/20140422/20140422_TX_trd.pdf for a full map of drought 
conditions as of April 22, 2014 (Heim, 2014). 
5 The Texas Wildfire Risk Assessment Portal provides public access interactive maps to help individuals 
and communities identify their wildfire risk: http://www.texaswildfirerisk.com/ (Texas A&M Forest 
Service, 2014).  
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industrial facilities storing various amounts of hazardous materials. In some cases these 
facilities are located dangerously close to sensitive populations or environmental areas.6  
As the population of Texas continues to grow, development expands out further 
towards sensitive areas. With more than half of the 15 fastest-growing US cities in 2012 
being located in Texas (US Census Bureau Public Information Office, 2013), 
development in physically vulnerable areas is becoming more frequent. An increasing 
number of communities across the state are exposed to hazardous conditions in low lying 
and coastal areas and on the wildland urban interface. 
In addition to physical and environmental exposure to hazards, Texas also suffers 
from extensive social vulnerabilities. The state historically has a higher poverty rate than 
the nation as a whole. Furthermore, more than half of those living in poverty in Texas are 
Hispanic (Dietz, 2009). The intersection of social, physical, and environmental 
vulnerability in Texas is most apparent in the colonias7 along the U.S.-Mexico border. In 
fact, Cameron and Hidalgo Counties in the Lower Rio Grande Valley are home to some 
of the poorest communities in the country and also suffer from chronic flooding and 
hurricane damage. The conditions of impoverished families living in substandard housing 
located in environmentally risky areas make for some of the most challenging conditions 
for effective disaster recovery efforts in the United States.  
The extent of these physical, social, and environmental vulnerabilities is matched 
by the opportunity for recovery activities to improve conditions in disaster-impacted 
areas. Many see recovery from a disaster as an opportunity to rebuild in less risky areas 
                                                
6 Following the 2013 West explosion increasing attention has been paid to where storage facilities for 
hazardous materials are located (Shipp, 2013).   
7 Colonias are unincorporated subdivisions often located in floodplains or otherwise unusable land that tend 
to lack basic services. Colonia residents are typically low-income Hispanic families that have very little 
other affordable housing options. The Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas published a comprehensive report on 
the conditions of Colonias in Texas in 1995 (Community Affairs Department, 1995).   
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with more resilient methods, which makes for a more sustainable future in recovering 
communities (P. R. Berke, Kartez, & Wenger, 1993; P. Berke, 1997; Mileti, 1999; Smith 
& Wenger, 2006; Steiner, Faga, Sipes, & Yaro, 2006). A critical examination of the 
strengths and weaknesses of disaster recovery efforts occurring across the state is 
required to advance future recovery programs towards more resilient goals. More 
productive and efficient recovery programs may contribute to a more sustainable future 
for vulnerable communities.    
1.2  RESEARCH GOALS 
This research path has emerged out of the author’s personal experience in disaster 
recovery housing efforts and curiosity about the consequences different leadership 
structures may have on a community’s future recovery capacity and resilience. The main 
question guiding this research is: What leadership models in the disaster recovery process 
contribute to future community resilience? Within this question lie additional questions 
concerning the motivations, values, priorities, and history of the organizations leading 
disaster recovery programs and how they influence who receives recovery resources and 
what the future of the communities they serve look like.  
Advancement of the recovery process requires more coordinated study of how 
different decision-makers influence the capacity of our communities to build resilient 
futures. Individual programs will likely require some amount of local innovation to meet 
the unique needs of individuals, communities, and events, but there may be identifiable 
qualities of the overall decision-making processes themselves that lead to more positive 
results than others. This may inform future disaster recovery practices without stifling the 
local innovation required to meet individual needs.  
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The intent of this research is to explore the implications different leadership 
structures may have on meeting recovery goals and building future capacity. It is 
assumed that the missions and goals identified by each organization will impact their 
prioritization and utilization of certain resources and types of knowledge that may or may 
not align with community recovery and capacity building goals. This knowledge may be 
leveraged by the increasing efforts to plan for recovery and help improve mitigation of 
current threats making for a quicker and safer recovery following disaster events (Mileti, 
1999).  
Bearing in mind the history of literature on state-led versus community-led 
disaster recovery programs, I expect to find that a more equitably distributed decision-
making system will likely lead to a more equitable distribution of recovery resources and 
greater consideration for future resilience. I expect that each program will have its 
deficits, but I believe the motivations behind those involved in the recovery process will 
greatly influence their ability to adapt, consider reality, and identify meaning in the 
disaster event, which will translate to the overall resilience of the local community. 
Ultimately the disaster recovery process will benefit from contributions of actors across 
all levels of government, civil society, private sector, and community members as each 
brings their own motivations and capacities that contribute to a greater resilience. 
These findings are intended to inform the design of future disaster recovery 
programs across the state that may better leverage or improve existing capacities at all 
levels of government and community organization. Recommendations will be provided to 
the State of Texas Senate Committee of Agriculture, Rural Affairs & Homeland Security 
that is currently conducting an interim study on disaster recovery plans across the State of 
Texas. The committee is charged with identifying essential personnel and resources 
required to increase existing response capabilities and recommend how state and local 
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governments and businesses can work together to assist with the rebuilding and recovery 
of impacted areas in the event of a disaster (State of Texas Senate, 2014). The results of 
this research will directly inform these recommendations and suggest that the state 
consider a broader view of disaster recovery as a process that contributes to future 
resilience in identifying appropriate recovery agents, resources, and priorities. 
1.3   CASE STUDY PROGRAMS 
This research is undertaken through a comparative case study of four disaster 
recovery housing programs exhibiting unique leadership structures and variation in 
recovery outcomes that reflect the current nature of disaster recovery across the state. 
These four cases provide a useful basis to analyze recovery programs across the state in 
order to understand how each type of leading organization defines recovery, who is 
served, and what implications there may be for meeting disaster recovery and resilience 
objectives. The organizations selected for analysis in this study are the Bastrop County 
Long Term Recovery Team (BCLTRT), Bastrop County General Land Office (GLO) 
Recovery Program, Lower Rio Grande Valley GLO Recovery Program administered by 
the Lower Rio Grande Valley Development Council (LRGVDC), and the Rio Grande 
Valley Rapid Housing Recovery Pilot Program (RAPIDO) administered by the 
Community Development Corporation of Brownsville (CDCB). Though the scope of this 
report includes only the housing portion of each of these programs, the conclusions 
drawn from them may inform all types of services provided in disaster recovery 
programs.  
Each case represents a different organizational leadership structure in the 
administration of disaster recovery housing programs in response to either the 2011 
Bastrop Complex Wildfires (Bastrop programs) or 2008 Hurricane Dolly (Rio Grande 
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Valley programs). Each program has access to different funding sources, community 
support, and expertise. Additionally, although all have occurred under the current state 
disaster recovery structure, each program is administered at a different level of 
government or non-governmental organization and has a distinct history within the 
communities they serve. 
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Chapter 2: Recent History of Texas Disaster Recovery 
The quality of disaster recovery is largely dependent on resource availability and 
organizational capacity for distribution. The majority of disaster recovery housing 
funding in the United States is made available to recovering communities through the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD). Over the last 50 years management of the disaster response 
and recovery process has increasingly fallen under the purview of federal and state 
governments (Rubin, 2012). Growing involvement of federal and state governments in 
financing response and recovery activities has led to the establishment of policy, 
authority, and organizational structures to support a government-based disaster recovery 
system. This shift in responsibility is evident in the dramatic increase of funds made 
available through Community Development Block Grant funding for Disaster Recovery 
(CDBG-DR) over the last 20 years as displayed in Figure 2.1 (U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development, 2014a). 
Figure 2.1: Congress appropriated CDBG-DR funding (U.S. Department of Housing 
and Urban Development, 2014a) 
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Figure 2.2: Texas Disaster Timeline 
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This increase in the federal government’s role in recovery comes at the same time 
researchers are calling for more local control of recovery priorities (P. R. Berke et al., 
1993; Brody, Kang, & Bernhardt, 2010; Ganapati, 2013). Some would prefer to see a 
return to a system where local government is primarily responsible for recovery 
(Schlossberg, 2013), while others advocate for civil society to take the lead (Chamlee-
Wright & Rothschild, 2007). Both local government and civil society organizations are 
identified as potential leaders because of the roles each play in local social and economic 
networks. Despite this push for local control, there is little movement towards developing 
the capacity required at the local level to participate in the decision-making process. 
Scholars warn that “limited technical and fiscal capabilities; a lack of political will to 
enact change; entrenched development interests, and the failure to engage in 
representative, participatory decision making” at the federal level substantially limit the 
pursuit of locally driven models (Smith, 2011). Even when locally driven models are 
supported, that support is often reduced to a point where innovation and improvement is 
stifled (Von Meding et al., 2010).   
The political context surrounding the time and place of a disaster heavily 
influences the roles established for leadership of the recovery effort. In order to set the 
stage for further discussion of individual recovery programs operating in Texas, the 
following section presents a review of the political leadership priorities established in the 
state over the last decade. The timeline in Figure 2.2 outlines the various disasters and 
recovery processes experienced across the state since 2008. Overall the state has 
struggled with constructing a balanced approach to recovery that provides enough 
resources from the state and federal level and support for the local capacity necessary to 
distribute resources appropriately on the ground.  
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When Hurricanes Ike and Dolly struck the Texas Gulf Coast in the summer of 
2008 responsibilities for disaster response and recovery activities were spread across 
several state agencies, making for a slow and opaque system. That year 45% of the 
counties in Texas were declared a Federal Disaster Area with an estimated $3.4 billion in 
housing assistance required to meet the needs of uninsured residents (R. Perry, Eckels, & 
Newby, 2008). Governor Perry’s request for federal aid outlines recovery objectives 
aimed to “recapture the quality of life that the 2008 storms have interrupted; all with an 
eye towards mitigating the impact of future storms” (R. Perry et al., 2008). The dramatic 
events of 2008 pushed the state towards a definition of recovery that includes future 
resilience and required restructuring of the established recovery systems.  
That fall, Governor Perry ordered the creation of a Commission for Disaster 
Recovery and Renewal in recognition that full recovery requires cooperation between 
local, state, and federal governments and organizations. The commission was created to 
document recovery needs and assist in seeking reimbursement from the federal 
government; make recommendations that reduce the impacts of future disasters and build 
public-private partnerships that improve the state’s ability to mitigate, respond to, and 
recover from disasters; and make recommendations that help rebuild communities and 
improve the quality of life and economic prosperity of their residents (R. Perry, 2008). A 
guiding principle of the commission was to consider that:  
Local governments are best equipped to assess their own damage and develop 
recovery plans tailored to their communities. But these communities need 
additional resources from an integration of private, public, and non-profit 
assistance to recover and to prepare for future disasters. (Eckels, 2009)  
The commission held four public hearings, two work group sessions, and heard public 
testimony across the impacted area to inform their report to the Governor. 
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Recommendations from this commission resulted in legislation passed and signed into 
law in 2009.   
The state action plan for recovery released in early 2009 also emphasized the 
importance of local leadership in the recovery process (Office of Rural Community 
Affairs Disaster Recovery Division, 2009). The plan outlines allocation strategies 
primarily targeted towards meeting the national objectives required for funding from 
HUD8. The regional Councils of Governments9 (COGs) are identified in the plan as the 
preferred lead agency for conducting recovery activities if they and their partners and/or 
subcontractors have the capacity to do so10. Capacity building for program 
implementation and compliance at the local level is identified by the plan as among the 
duties of the state. The initial action plan and its subsequent five revisions have brought 
the state $3.1 billion across two separate allocations of CDBG-DR funds (Texas General 
Land Office, 2014a).  
                                                
8 All activities funded by HUD must address at least one of the following national objectives: (1) benefit 
low- and moderate- income persons; (2) address slums or blight; or (3) meet a particularly urgent 
community development need (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2002). 
9 Council of Government is a voluntary regional planning organization designated by the state composed of 
several local governmental bodies. There are 24 regional councils of governments in Texas with the largest 
serving 22 counties and the smallest serving 3 counties. They exist to coordinate planning needs that cross 
the boundaries of individual governments within the planning area and “to provide cost-effective, better 
planned, and more accountable public services in each region of Texas.” The activities COGs in Texas 
typically take part in are economic development, emergency planning, air quality and water planning, solid 
waste disposal, transportation planning, procurement agreements, and provision of GIS data for the region. 
(Texas Association of Regional Councils, 2014) 
10 According to the State of Texas Plan for Disaster Recovery demonstration of capacity can be achieved 
through the following methods: (1) by demonstrating the local entity’s proven capacity to administer 
program funds efficiently as a Sub-recipient of the state to the satisfaction of the state agency; or (2) by the 
local entity partnering with one or more other local governments with capacity to administer program funds 
efficiently as a Sub-recipient of the state; or (3) by the local entity electing to procure an eligible 
subcontractor with proven capacity directly, or if available, elect to subcontract with one or more 
contractors procured by the state for administration of housing programs. (Office of Rural Community 
Affairs Disaster Recovery Division, 2009) 
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Meanwhile, a Natural Disaster Housing Reconstruction Advisory Committee was 
formed to develop a Natural Disaster Housing Reconstruction Plan11. The committee was 
made up of local, state, and federal entities, organizations, and nonprofits tasked with 
composing a model for the delivery of disaster recovery services by state agencies 
(Lucio, 2009). This plan also informed the design of a Housing Reconstruction 
Demonstration Pilot Program to test methods of production and delivery for replacement 
housing in disaster impacted areas across the state. The plan’s recommendations largely 
focus on creating stronger partnerships between local, regional, and state agencies for a 
more effective and efficient recovery process (Natural Disaster Housing Reconstruction 
Advisory Committee, 2010).   
Despite these echoing claims by appointed committees, legislation, and plans that 
increasing local control would lead to more efficient resource distribution, nearly one 
year into the recovery process resources still had not reached significant portions of the 
population impacted by the hurricanes. Distribution decisions made at local levels of 
government only furthered preexisting inequities in access to resources by low-income 
communities across the impacted regions.  This instance of local control was plagued by 
a history of discrimination, lack of on-the-ground capacity, lack of technical assistance, 
and lack of performance standards that worked to keep the most disadvantaged 
populations from receiving recovery aid (Way & Sloan, 2013). The inadequacy of this 
fund distribution process prompted the issuance of a fair housing complaint against the 
                                                
11 Specific charges for the plan include: (1) evaluate existing systems of providing temporary housing to 
victims of natural disasters and develop alternative systems to increase efficiency and cost-effectiveness; 
(2) evaluate existing models for providing permanent replacement housing to victims of natural disasters; 
(3) design alternatives to existing models to improve the sustainability, affordability, desirability, and 
quality of housing rebuilt in the event of future natural disasters; (4) evaluate economic circumstances of 
elderly, disabled, and low-income victims of natural disasters and develop models for providing affordable 
replacement housing; (5) recommend programs for the rapid and efficient large-scale production of 
temporary and permanent replacement housing following a natural disaster; and (6) encourage the 
participation, coordination, and involvement of appropriate federal organizations. (Lucio, 2009) 
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State of Texas by local fair housing advocates (Henneberger, 2009). This complaint laid 
out the failings of the state to meet its obligations to affirmatively further fair housing in 
its distribution of CDBG-DR funds12.  
In response to this complaint and subsequent withholding of funds for Hurricanes 
Ike and Dolly recovery, the complainants, Texas Low Income Housing Information 
Service with Texas Appleseed, and the State of Texas agencies responsible for disaster 
recovery at the time, the Texas Department of Rural Affairs and Texas Department of 
Housing and Community Affairs, came to a conciliation agreement. In the agreement 
each party “committed themselves to affirmatively furthering fair housing for survivors 
of [Hurricanes Ike and Dolly] in an expeditious manner” (Texas Low Income Housing 
Information Service, Texas Appleseed, & State of Texas, 2010). Housing initiatives 
specifically identified in the agreement include an affordable rental-housing program, 
one-for-one replacement of public housing units damaged or destroyed in the disasters, a 
disaster housing demonstration program, a title clearance and legal assistance program, a 
rebuilding subsidized housing program, an impacted area buyout program, and a moving 
to opportunity program. All of which are designed to hold decision-makers accountable 
for providing more housing opportunities and limiting barriers to fair housing choices for 
all groups impacted by the disaster.13 Furthermore, integrating these community-based 
                                                
12 The specific allegations outlined in the complaint are: (1) The state discriminates and permits its sub-
recipients to discriminate; (2) The state’s affirmatively furthering fair housing certification is unsatisfactory 
because it is based on an obsolete analysis of impediments; (3) The state’s affirmatively furthering fair 
housing certification is false; (4) The state has violated its own affirmatively furthering fair housing 
obligation and failed to enforce the obligations of sub-recipients; (5) The State’s analysis of impediments 
fails to organize appropriate actions to overcome impediments, artificially limits consideration of non-
federal resources, and is based on insufficient public consultation (Henneberger, 2009). 
13 Recipients of HUD funds including the Community Development Block Grant-Disaster Recovery funds 
are required to: (1) examine and attempt to alleviate housing discrimination within their jurisdiction; (2) 
promote fair housing choice for all persons; (3) provide opportunities for all persons to reside in any given 
housing development, regardless of race, color, religion, sex, disability, familial status, or national origin; 
(4) promote housing that is accessible to and usable by persons with disabilities; (5) and comply with the 
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recovery strategies is intended to secure adequate local funding for the poorest and 
hardest-hit residents, address the entrenched disparities that constructed vulnerabilities in 
the first place, and institutionalize systems that “facilitate long-term community 
engagement and structural reforms” (Way & Sloan, 2013).  
In addition to this reaffirmed mandate for fair housing in disaster recovery the 
governor also transferred all disaster recovery activities to the GLO in order to “provide 
more accountability to the disaster recovery program” (Henneberger, 2011). Locating 
these responsibilities within one agency is intended to “give local communities a single 
contact, cut red tape, and reduce administrative costs” according to the GLO’s website 
(Texas General Land Office, 2014a). The agency acts as the grant administrator for all 
CDBG-DR funds and provides support to local governmental units administering 
recovery programs. 
Shortly after the GLO took over management of the state’s disaster recovery 
grants residents of Bastrop County experienced one of the most devastating wildfires in 
the state’s history. The September 2011 wildfire destroyed 61% of the homes within its 
perimeter making it the largest per capita loss fire in the country at the time (Ridenour et 
al., 2012). Before the fires were even over, the county drew up and began enacting its 
own plan for physical and economic recovery. This plan laid out an organizational 
structure for coordination between a debris management group, environmental group, 
road and bridge group, finance group, and a long-term recovery group (Ridenour, et al. 
2012). The long-term recovery group began with the help of FEMA, the Central Texas 
Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster, and the Texas Division of Emergency 
Management and later evolved into the BCLTRT. The group held its first meeting in late 
                                                                                                                                            
non-discrimination requirements of the Fair Housing Act (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, 2014b). 
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September and began repairing and rebuilding homes within a couple months of the 
wildfire.   
Though local recovery efforts began immediately, the first State of Texas Disaster 
Recovery Plan for the wildfires was issued 9 months later in July of 2012. Rather than 
distribute HUD funds through local COGs, as was done in the Hurricane Ike and Dolly 
recovery programs, the GLO decided to conduct a state-run recovery program 
independent from local efforts (Texas General Land Office, 2012). The state began 
accepting applications for their housing program in September of 2012, one year after the 
wildfire. This late start and narrow coordination with other recovery efforts has led to 
limited enrollment in the state-led program.  
The diagram in Figure 2.3 describes the different paths currently possible for the 
administration of disaster recovery funds in the State of Texas. The GLO acts in a sense 
as the clearinghouse of recovery funds and may either administer the funds directly to 
recovering households or go through regional or local governmental entities. Often the 
GLO, regional, or local agencies 
hire a private contractor of some 
sort to manage the day-to-day 
administration of the program. 
An industry for grant 
administration by private for-
profit organizations has emerged 
in the last decade; enticing 
major national and inter-national 
accounting and engineering 
firms to develop specialties in 
 
Figure 2.3: Texas Disaster Recovery Administration 
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emergency management and disaster recovery grant administration. Other third-party 
entities may include non-profit or community organizations. Sometimes these community 
or non-profit organizations operate independently from the GLO to leverage private 
donations and local expertise to meet recovery needs in the community. 
Communities across the state continuously teeter between a desire for local 
control and a need for more accountability in the recovery process. The plethora of 
program administration structures available exhibits this struggle. The following 
literature review confirms that Texas is not along in this dilemma. As this section 
provided the Texas context for studying the recovery process, the following section 
provides the research context required to analyze the Texas experience.  
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Chapter 3: Literature Review 
3.1  THE STUDY OF DISASTERS 
Disasters have been a focus of academic research since the 1970s. Most disaster 
research is done through case studies that treat each disaster as a unique event (Sylves, 
2008). Some have questioned the productivity of conflating individual elements of these 
events with the disaster itself as an object of analysis (Guggenheim, 2014). Those who 
study disasters may see them from roughly two different viewpoints, either as producing 
politics or as the result of politics. Where one’s analysis of a disaster is situated within 
these viewpoints informs the assumptions made about the structure of the decision 
making process before, during, and after the disaster event (Guggenheim, 2014).  
My assumptions about the study of disasters are rooted in what Guggenheim 
identifies as cosmopolitics. From this perspective disasters are events in which “the 
world” as we know it is unraveled and recreated. The role of the researcher from this 
perspective is to ask questions about who is recognized as a legitimate actor and what 
capacities they have in the recreation of our social, political, and physical structures. Each 
case study undertaken in this research is lead by different groups of actors with different 
values informing the recreation of the social, political, and physical world of the 
impacted community.   
In order to examine leadership structures in decision-making processes one must 
first understand the motivations behind studying the disaster recovery process itself. The 
Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1988, which continues to 
provide the guiding framework for federal-state disaster assistance in the United States, is 
aligned by some researchers with the argument that a government has a moral obligation 
to protect people and property from harm, including natural disasters. According to this 
view, the extent of the government’s role in disaster mitigation and recovery activities is 
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tied to a collective ethical standard and moral foundation to which society ought to 
uphold in protecting its citizenry (Beatley, 1989).  
More recently, this morality argument is being reframed as one for sustainability. 
Many have tied environmental quality to human quality, calling for sustainability to take 
on a “redistributive function” in linking race, class, justice, equity and environment 
(Agyeman, 2008). This role of sustainability is tied to disaster recovery by literature that 
recognizes the importance of recovery actions in determining sustainable development 
outcomes (P. Berke, 1997; Smith & Wenger, 2006). Preexisting inequities expose 
particular populations to more disaster risk and limit access to resources following a 
disaster (Patterson, 2013). Decisions made in recovery can either exacerbate these 
vulnerabilities or improve conditions depending on how priorities are identified and 
executed (Smith & Wenger, 2006). The sustainable distribution of disaster recovery 
resources is thus tied to social, economic, and environmental values of those leading the 
decision-making process.  
3.2  DISASTER RECOVERY AND RESILIENCE 
As with many academic endeavors, consensus on certain terms in the disaster 
literature has proven difficult to achieve. Still, the task of defining the meaning of 
concepts like recovery and resilience has become a vital part of the global conversation 
about what it means to be sustainable in the face of climate change. The fluidity of these 
definitions makes identifying benchmarks for achieving these concepts an even more 
daunting task. The aim of this review is not to determine the most comprehensive or 
accurate definitions and measurements, but to highlight the complexity of the concepts 
themselves and the value different perspectives place on the relationships between 
disaster recovery and resilience.  
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Disasters are generally described as disruptions in daily life caused by conflicts 
between our physical environment (exposure to hazardous conditions or event), social 
and demographic characteristics of community (social vulnerability), and the constructed 
environment (buildings and development patterns) (Mileti, 1999). Many scholars contend 
that the disasters we study are more sociological constructs rather than natural events 
(Bankoff, 2004; P. Berke, 1997; Mileti, 1999; R. W. Perry, 2006). Likewise, the process 
of recovery from disasters requires more than a technocratic effort to reestablish business 
as usual (Bankoff, 2004; P. Berke, 1997; Mileti, 1999; Rubin, 1985; Smith & Wenger, 
2006; Smith, 2011).  
The term recovery has historically been interchangeable with reconstruction, 
restoration, rehabilitation, and redevelopment, but as the disaster cycle continues to be 
reassessed, the recovery stage is increasingly being linked to mitigation and preparedness 
for future events (Mileti, 1999; Quarantelli, 1998). Temporally, recovery is seen as the 
stage following initial relief activities after a disaster in which survivors are participating 
in activities to resume daily life (Quarantelli, 1995). It is conceived of as a process that 
can be studied and applied thoughtfully rather than a measurable result of finite activities 
(Mileti, 1999).  
Several scholars have established that disaster recovery is a deeply political 
process guided by the expressed values of those in dominant decision-making positions 
(Guggenheim, 2014; Olson, 2000; Rubin, 1985). Olson’s 2000 article grounds this 
argument with the simple fact that “in any disaster, government officials are confronted 
with the need to not only manage the situation but also explain it.” The decisions made 
about how to manage and explain the situation are recognized in the literature as “value 
choices that give varying emphasis to early return to normalcy, the reduction of future 
vulnerability, or opportunities for improved efficiency, equity, and amenity” (Rubin, 
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1985). The political process of establishing what happened, who was impacted, and how 
to move forward is guided by the values of decision-makers (Olson, 2000).  As such, 
disaster recovery is defined by how decisions are made, who is involved in making them, 
and who benefits from them. The methods by which recovery activities are conducted 
reflect dominant societal values and future capacity to deal with disruptions.  
Capacity is a large part of the discussion in the literature about what a disaster is 
and who leads in the recovery process. Disasters are often considered to be simply an 
overwhelming of capacity to deal with disruption (Aldrich, 2012). That capacity 
continues to define the disaster by way of the recovery experience. Rubin identifies three 
key elements of recovery: personal leadership, the ability to act, and knowledge of what 
to do, that describe a community’s capacity to conduct recovery activities (Rubin, 1985). 
The presence or lack of these three elements determines the ability of groups to take part 
in the decision making process about the future of the impacted community. While these 
three elements can be used to describe capacity across all levels of government and 
organization, capacity at the local level is particularly important in disaster recovery. 
Some factors that influence local capacity are the state of existing infrastructure, the size 
of the jurisdiction, the state of the local economy, and the specific needs of local 
vulnerable and at-risk populations (Schlossberg, 2013). 
In some scholarship capacity is linked directly to resilience. Similarly to recovery, 
resilience may also be identified as a social, political, and physical process rather than a 
product resulting from isolated actions. Resilience is generally recognized across social, 
psychological, physical, and technical sciences as a complex concept that balances 
between dynamic adaptation and static resistance to disruption (Alexander, 2013; 
Peacock, 2010). Considering the current tensions in the literature in further defining 
systems of resilience, it may be more useful for the purposes of this report to take a 
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pragmatic approach in examining the characteristics of resilience rather than try to take 
on the task of aligning with a specific scholarly definition.  
Three characteristics identified in the study of individual and organizational 
resilience that may also be useful in examining communities and their disaster recovery 
processes are a staunch acceptance of reality (awareness of disaster risk), a search for 
meaning (the values a community holds for their future), and an ability to improvise 
(adaptability to dynamic conditions) (Coutu, 2002). Each of these characteristics 
contributes to an ability to build operationally flexible links between current reality and a 
preferred future condition. Another author identifies five dimensions of resilience that are 
viewed as deeply linked to the local context: (1) personal and familial socio-
psychological well being; (2) organizational and institutional restoration; (3) economic 
and commercial resumption of services and productivity; (4) restoring infrastructural 
systems integrity; and (5) operational regularity of public safety and government 
(McCreight, 2010). Resilience in this setting is defined as the “capacity to weather crises 
such as disasters and engage in effective and efficient recovery through coordinated 
efforts and cooperative activities” (Aldrich, 2012). From this perspective, the main 
distinction between recovery and resilience is the focus on planning and strategic 
mitigation for long-term survival (McCreight, 2010). Planning for recovery requires a 
certain amount of local capacity to coordinate activities between state and federal 
governments, nonprofit organizations, and private businesses (Schlossberg, 2013). 
Some literature goes even further to identify indicators of resilience that measure 
the social, economic, physical, and human capital available at a specific community scale 
(Cutter, Burton, & Emrich, 2010; Peacock, 2010). Frameworks such as the Community 
Disaster Resilience Index may be useful in identifying existing resilience strengths and 
weaknesses across spatial and social geographies, but say little about how these 
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capacities interact in the recovery decision-making process. The personalities and 
histories of different actors in the disaster cycle impact how capital is leveraged to benefit 
different groups in a community. Rather than identifying individual indicators that 
produce a statistically more resilient community, this report seeks to understand how 
processes of decision-making across various existing and emerging organizational 
structures lead to productive perspectives of resilience to future disaster risks. 
3.3  ORGANIZATIONS IN DISASTER RECOVERY 
An understanding of operational models and the actors within them is required in 
order to productively discuss the implications of decision-making in disaster recovery 
programs. Different actors in the disaster recovery process have different perceptions of 
recovery and resilience that influence how they define their role, how they identify 
priorities, and how they envision the future of the community impacted by the disaster 
(Rubin, 1985). In order to study the recovery process we need to understand the different 
types of organizations leading the disaster recovery effort. Richard Sylves broadly 
outlines the dichotomy between Hamiltonian and Jeffersonian public management 
approaches, analytical and social constructivist views, and the privilege of codified and 
un-codified knowledge that define much of the conflicts that occur in disaster recovery 
operations today (Sylves, 2008). Hamiltonian decision-makers draw from their 
specialized expertise to produce desired results, while a Jeffersonian decision-making 
process relies on knowledge of relationships between the agents at play to achieve results. 
Identification of the methods of decision-making and the networks of decision-makers in 
the recovery process reveals the various types of organizations and the values they hold. 
Several types of organizations typically participate in a disaster recovery effort. 
Groups generally fall under the categories of public sector organizations, quasi-
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governmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, nonprofit relief 
organizations, private sector organizations, international relief organizations and nations, 
emergent groups, and individuals. These groups provide varying levels of financial, 
policy-based, and technical assistance throughout the disaster cycle (Smith, 2011). The 
social, political, and historical context surrounding the disaster event influences how 
these actors work together to conduct coordinated or disparate recovery activities.    
Models of disaster recovery in the United States in the past have relied on the top 
down provision of resources and decision-making processes. A more traditional recovery 
scheme “emphasizes the management of federal assistance programs rather than a 
systematic identification of community needs” that may increase exposure to hazards, 
worsen economic strains, and perpetuate social inequities (Smith & Wenger, 2006). New 
models that advocate whole-community recovery call for inclusion of multiple 
community stakeholders than have not traditionally been involved in government 
recovery programs (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2011). With less 
government resources available, leaders in the federal government are looking more 
toward local governments and non-governmental organizations to lead recovery activities 
that build local preparedness and resiliency. Other models advocate for a mostly civil 
society approach to recovery that relies on social-capital based strategies such as mutual 
assistance, charitable action, and commercial cooperation (Chamlee-Wright & 
Rothschild, 2007).  
The transition from government to governance is a trend in managing disaster 
risks and impacts that is gaining recognition in the literature. With the increasing 
complexity of our social, economic, and political systems, governance models offer a 
higher level of collective decision making that engages stakeholders in problems that 
extend beyond the scope of any single actor (Tierney, 2012). These emerging 
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perspectives recognize that state-based action is not the only way to deal with hazards, 
and civil society institutions and private-sector entities across multiple scales also have a 
role to play. Some go so far as to claim that without involvement from civil or human 
rights oriented organizations, “one disaster compounds another and leads to additional 
and persistent inequities” (Patterson, 2013). Public administration scholars identify this 
third-party governance system as the “hollow state” where numerous government 
agencies share authority with nonprofit and private organizations (Milward & Provan, 
2000).  
The danger in the perspective that local is better is its assumption that local 
community-based organizations actually have the capacity to participate in leadership 
networks. Milward and Provan point out that “there is little evidence that we know much 
more about how to manage decentralized programs effectively at the community level” 
(Milward & Provan, 2000). A disconnect in the hollow state occurs when one party in the 
network lacks the capacity to deliver services, leading to a failure of the entire system. At 
the community-level this failure often presents itself as a lack of accountability and 
responsiveness (Fredericksen & London, 2000). Governance is necessarily polycentric 
and multi-scalar in order to cope with the complexity and heterogeneity of disaster 
events, community contexts, and future risks that the recovery process requires (Tierney, 
2012), but in order to be effective capacity to deliver services and monitor the system 
must also exist across multiple scales (Fredericksen & London, 2000). Evidence from 
several studies suggests that releases of federal funds for disaster recovery are more 
successful when they involve partnerships with local community groups, nonprofits, and 
regional organizations (Smith, 2011), proving that when the capacity exists the system 
works well.  
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Still, some scholars are not convinced that breaks in the governance system 
explain all of the variation in recovery across a disaster impact area. Aldrich encourages 
disaster scholars to consider the advances made in other sociological fields in 
understanding the role of social capital in civil society. His case studies of several 
disaster events reveal that higher levels of social capital expressed through strong social 
networks, civic engagement, and active citizenship “serve as the core engine of 
recovery,” more so than other physical, social, or political factors (Aldrich, 2012). As 
much as increased social capital helps those who have it, a lack of social capital can be 
more detrimental to recovery than any other indicator of vulnerability as it largely 
determines an individual’s access to information, tools, and assistance. This literature 
distinguishes the role of individuals and informal networks in the recovery process, 
which must be considered along with the roles of more formal organizations discussed by 
most disaster scholars.   
A framework for understanding the relationships between the various actors in 
disaster recovery has been proposed by Berke, Kartez, and Wenger to explain why some 
efforts are more successful in achieving equity, mitigation, and sustainable recovery (P. 
R. Berke et al., 1993). This typology identifies the necessity of both horizontal 
integration (relationships among community social units and subsystems) and vertical 
integration (relationships across levels of government and external organizations) of 
recovery activities (P. R. Berke et al., 1993). Communities with strong horizontal and 
vertical relationships are able to access external resources quickly and distribute them 
effectively to address unique local needs. A breakdown in either axis leads to slower 
recovery and inefficient use of resources. This model combines the concepts from the 
hollow state and the vertical systems it involves with the notion that social capital ties 
communities together horizontally.  
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3.4  THE GAP IN CURRENT RESEARCH 
Though the concepts of recovery and resilience are intimately connected in the 
literature, there is currently little consideration of how these concepts are linked to those 
actually leading the recovery effort. Past case studies in the disaster literature reveal 
valuable information about individual experiences of recovery in specific contexts, but 
there is room to expand on the overall characteristics of the organizational leadership 
structures themselves and how they influence the larger recovery experience. Research is 
required to inform more thoughtful recovery programs that utilize the social and physical 
assets of a community while building capacity to lessen the impact of future disasters.  
Operationally, the perceptions and values of those individuals and organizations 
in leadership positions on the ground have more impact on recovery outcomes than any 
of the definitions and benchmarks identified in the literature. A deeper understanding of 
how leadership structures influence decision-making in recovery and envisioning of the 
future will contribute to stronger links between literature on organizations, recovery and 
resilience. 
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Chapter 4: Leadership Structures 
Disasters often force the development of new leadership structures for decision-
making that echo “the social realities of the situation rather than an artificial creation 
based on unrealistic notions” (Dynes & Quarantelli, 1974). The literature previously cited 
supports the idea that different entities involved in disaster recovery operations tend to 
have different perceptions of: (1) their roles in recovery; (2) their priorities during 
recovery; (3) the importance of post-disaster mitigation efforts; and (4) the proper 
location of recovery planning and decision making (Rubin, 1985). Considering this, I 
have found it helpful to make the distinction between leadership structures in disaster 
recovery by how recovery is defined, who defines it, and who receives recovery 
resources.  
The assumption guiding this organizing framework is that the varying interests of 
different leading actors in the recovery process result in different scopes of recovery 
activities and identification of those recovering. The decision-makers identified in this 
framework are public, private, non-profit, and individuals. Public entities include 
government actors across all levels and tend to have specific top-down mandates guiding 
their actions. Non-profit entities lie opposite the public sector in the following diagrams 
because their mandates tend to come from the community itself. Both private sector 
organizations and individuals tend to act in their own interest, but they sit opposite each 
other in the following diagrams because their interests tend to be opposing.  
In this framework, the recovery experience on the ground is guided by how 
decision-makers define the disaster, identify who is impacted by it, and envision the 
future of the impacted area. Thus, decision-makers set recovery priorities according to 
these insights. Only having one type of organization in a leadership position will 
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inherently sway the priorities and resource distribution toward one perception of the 
disaster, while models with multiple types of leaders may cover a wider range of 
perceptions.  
There are four basic models of disaster recovery leadership I have developed from 
the literature and evidence in the field: whole community, government-centric, 
community-centric, and a hybrid model (see Figure 4.1). In each instance, how the 
leading entity defines the disaster and who is identified as being impacted determines the 
extent of the recovery program and how resources are distributed.  
Figure 4.1: Disaster Recovery Leadership Models 
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There is a growing movement in disaster recovery research and practice to 
promote what is known as whole community recovery. Under this model, decision-
making responsibilities are distributed among government entities, emergency 
responders, community organizations, and individuals impacted by the hazard. The 
assumption is that a distributed network of decision-makers fosters a better match 
between a community’s needs, capacity, and resources (Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, 2011). This model tends to be more vertically and horizontally integrated than 
others. Ideally, this leads to more effective and equitable distribution of resources and 
services and builds greater capacity to respond to future disasters.  
In what is termed in this report as a government-centric model, program and 
outreach priorities identified by federal and state mandate are the focus of recovery 
efforts. This approach brings abundant resources that often require a high level of 
administrative capacity and vertical integration to distribute. Local priorities may be 
overlooked if they do not align with federal or state directives and those who are 
distrustful of government intervention may be self-excluded from the recovery effort.  
In the community-centric model, local administrators lead the decision-making 
process in resource distribution. In this model the resource pool is likely to be far less 
than in the government-centric model, but local knowledge of disaster impact and 
community values contributes to more individually targeted resource distribution. The 
community-centric model relies heavily on the horizontal integration of pre-existing 
social networks and administrative capacities available within the impacted community   
What may be more typical on the ground is a hybrid of the community-centric and 
government-centric models. In the hybrid model identified in this report both local and 
governmental resources are utilized across distinct concurrent programs that consider 
federal, state, and local disaster recovery priorities. Through complimentary local action 
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and government intervention, wider ranges of individuals receive resources targeted 
toward their distinct disaster experience. This model may have elements of vertical and 
horizontal integration that may not be fully leveraged. Lapses in coordination between 
efforts may lead to some level of duplication, but implementing multiple modes of 
leadership may result in a broader reach of assistance throughout the impacted area. 
These frameworks are used in the following sections to categorize the case study 
programs selected for this report. Though each program exhibits characteristics that align 
more or less with the models presented in this section, the heterogeneity of programs, 
politics, and places make it nearly impossible to draw hard lines between each type. 
Rather, the lines between each of the models presented here are somewhat blurred due to 
the complexity of disaster events and the social context they interact with. These models 
are intended serve as a general organizing framework for the following discussion of 
each program rather than a definite set of categories.  
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Chapter 5: Methodology 
The conclusions drawn from this research come from a belief that program 
leadership impacts how recovery is defined and if resilience is fostered. This belief is 
rooted in a long line of scholarship on agency in decision-making processes. On one end 
of the spectrum it is thought that localized decision-making results in greater social 
justice while the other end contends that centralized decision-making results in greater 
efficiency (Purcell, 2006). Recovery and resilience are viewed as the ultimate results of 
distinct decision-making processes in disaster recovery programs. Those engaged in the 
decision-making processes of these programs have direct impact on how individuals 
recover from the disaster and what their future resilience will be. This report seeks to 
identify how different types of decision-making leadership impact recovery and 
resilience.   
This report comes from an assumption that multiple perspectives compose reality 
and that the role of the researcher is to draw out these various perspectives in order to 
reconstruct a view of the world. By nature, this mode of understanding is nonlinear in 
that information is continuously brought in and assessed against other evidence to 
compose a more current view. The perspectives sought in this research are organized 
through four case studies of disaster recovery housing programs in the State of Texas 
which include: the BCLTRT, the GLO Bastrop Wildfire Recovery program, the GLO 
Hurricane Dolly recovery program in the Lower Rio Grande Valley administered by the 
LRGVDC, and RAPIDO administered by CDCB.  
Being the most widely used tool for studying disasters, many case studies have 
been documented in an effort to discover how disaster recovery processes are conducted 
and to assess their success. Often the goal of this research is to inform how recovery 
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programs should be conducted in the future. Many identify divergent practices within the 
same disaster event in order to analyze how different factors throughout the recovery 
process influence the results of recovery efforts. Some researchers in the disaster field 
choose to study one event or phenomenon in a specific case in order to gain a deeper 
understanding of that particular occurrence, while others choose multiple cases exhibiting 
different perspectives in order to build a more robust, generalizable, and testable theory 
about that phenomenon.  
Scholars recognize that taking on multiple comparative case studies can provide a 
powerful basis for theory building in qualitative research (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). 
In this report, four disaster recovery housing programs have been selected to represent 
different leadership structures for decision-making in order to build a theory on how 
leadership structures in disaster recovery programs impact future recovery capacity and 
resilience. Though the four cases come from two disaster events and geographic 
locations, they are considered individually in this report because of their distinct 
leadership structures. The political and social contexts of each program are considered 
here to have a larger impact on program leadership than the physical context of the 
disaster itself. As such, these cases are distinguished by leadership structure rather than 
by the disasters to which they respond.   
There are two cases that are largely state or regionally led and two that involve 
local leadership. The cases from the 2011 Bastrop Complex Wildfire recovery effort 
include a community-led program by the BCLTRT and a state-led program by the GLO. 
These two programs have great variation in resource availability and types of individuals 
served in the community. The cases from the 2008 Hurricane Dolly recovery effort in the 
Lower Rio Grande Valley represent a regionally-led effort and a community-led effort 
that both operate under the state agency. Both programs in the Lower Rio Grande Valley 
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are acting through a contract with the GLO and have roughly the same resource 
availability and regulatory requirements. Despite a common heritage, these programs 
have developed very different relationships within the community that have led to 
variation in services rendered and individuals helped.  
Each case in this research effort was built from a variety of data sources, 
including semi-structured interviews, archival data, and actor-network mapping. The 
semi-structured interviews play the largest role in this research, as they provide a view of 
each organization’s decision-making process from the perspective of those engaged in the 
process itself. One or two individuals identified as decision-makers in the program were 
interviewed in order to reconstruct an official framework of how the recovery program is 
conducted and an on the ground framework of how the program actually operates.  
Each interviewee was asked a series of questions that related to the mission and 
goals of the organization, how they view recovery, and who has agency in the decision-
making process (please refer to the full protocol in Appendix A for complete list of 
questions). The interviewee was also asked to provide the organization’s actor-network 
structure in order to identify who participates in decisions about the program, what steps 
are taken in making program decisions, who receives services, how those services are 
determined, and what kind of timeline is involved in administering recovery services to 
disaster survivors. Information collected through interviews was coupled with supporting 
documentation provided on state and organization websites regarding program metrics 
and operation.  
These sources taken together compose a triangulated story of how each program 
defines its motivations, goals, measure of recovery and recovery unit, perspective of 
recovery, and the transferability of their efforts to other risks faced by the community 
they serve through the framework of their leadership structure and decision-making 
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processes. These characteristics come from a family of literature on how success and 
failure is perceived in recovery programs (Quarantelli, 1998; Rubin, 1985) and relates to 
how each program contributes to characteristics of resilience (Coutu, 2002; McCreight, 
2010).  Using a grounded theory approach, data from multiple data sources was analyzed 
for each case using Hyper Research14 to identify how the decision-making process of 
each organization impacts how recovery is assessed and thusly how future resilience is 
conceived across the different program leadership structures. Figure 5.1 graphically 
describes this research methodology. 
The following section utilizes the methods described here to identify the history, 
perspective of recovery, leadership model, and perception of resilience for each case 
study program. This information contributes to a general understanding of how each 
leadership structure is distinct and how leadership perceptions guide program goals and 
outcomes. This understanding may guide the design of future program leadership 
structures towards more intentionally resilient recovery outcomes.  
 
                                                
14 Hyper Research is a qualitative data analysis tool used to code, retrieve, build theories, and conduct 
analyses of data. 
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Figure 5.1: Research Diagram  
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Chapter 6: Texas Disaster Housing Recovery Case Studies 
The following sections describe the history, perspective of recovery, leadership 
model, and perception of resilience for each of the four disaster recovery programs 
chosen for this report. The history section describes how the program and leading 
organizations emerged following the disaster and their position in the community prior to 
the disaster. The recovery section reviews how leaders from the organization and 
information provided by the organization describe the recovery goals of the program. The 
leadership section describes the organizations involved in conducting the program, their 
internal organization, and relationships with other recovery agents in the community. The 
resilience section discusses how the organization sees its involvement in future recovery 
efforts and how the current program has contributed to local capacity.  
6.1  BASTROP COUNTY LONG TERM RECOVERY TEAM 
History 
Before the 2011 Bastrop Complex Wildfire was even extinguished, leaders in 
Bastrop County drew up and began enacting a recovery plan for the physical and 
economic recovery of the impacted communities. This plan laid out an organizational 
structure that included a debris management group, an environmental group, a road and 
bridge group, a finance group, and a long-term recovery group (Ridenour et al., 2012). 
The local FEMA representative initiated the long-term recovery group.  
A long-term recovery group is typically established as part of FEMA’s directive 
toward whole community recovery and is intended to facilitate coordination, funding, and 
technical support for state, tribal, regional, and local governments, non-governmental 
organizations, and the private sector (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2011). 
As part of its protocol, the agency assists in creating a Long Term Recovery Committee 
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made up of local government officials, non-governmental organizations, and community 
leaders to identify community priorities and plan for recovery long after the agency 
leaves. Sometimes these organizations carry on through the local government, but most 
often they are dissolved following a satisfactory level of recovery or when FEMA is no 
longer active in the recovery process.  
The BCLTRT emerged out of this initial committee due to strong local leadership, 
access to knowledgeable housing and rebuilding organizations in nearby cities, and an 
ability to secure funds for rebuilding. The decision was made only three months after the 
fire to incorporate the team as an independent 501(c)3 organization. The organization’s 
leaders felt that this was a necessary step to enable access to more direct funding sources, 
build trust within the community, and provide them the freedom to operate recovery 
programs appropriate to the community’s needs. 
The organization and its leaders continue to gain recognition in the community as 
valuable assets to the recovery effort. The Bastrop Chamber of Commerce recently 
awarded the organization’s executive director and president as the 2013 Citizen of the 
Year and Point of Light respectively for their involvement in the recovery effort (Bastrop 
Chamber of Commerce, 2014). Other leaders of the organization’s Board of Directors 
and Advisory Committee are also prominent volunteers, business owners, and active 
citizens in the local community. The social networks and reputations of these leaders 
contribute to greater recognition of the organization regionally and access to resources for 
their recovery program.  
Recovery 
The mission of the BCLTRT is “to assist low-income uninsured and underinsured 
individuals and families with recovery” (BCLTRT, 2014). Representatives from the 
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organization emphasize the importance of recovering as a community and recognize the 
need for all members of their community to be able to return. Recovery is defined by 
leaders of the organization as the ability for all members of the community who want to 
rebuild to have the support and resources to do so. The team recognized an immediate 
need for housing following the fire and saw that a few groups in particular were unable to 
access the resources they needed to rebuild. A small but significant portion of the 
homeowners they serve are very distrustful of the government and never sought recovery 
resources from FEMA or the GLO. The BCLTRT’s reputation in the community and 
independence from the government allows them to identify and serve individuals who 
otherwise would be reluctant to access recovery resources.  
The organization and its supporters consider the homes built by the BCLTRT as 
much a contribution to the recovery of the local economy as they are to the physical 
rebuilding of neighborhoods. By the fall of 2014, the organization will have completed a 
total of 128 new or rehabilitated single-family homes with around three million dollars. 
Half of the organization’s budget comes from a $1.5 million grant from the American 
Red Cross as part of their new effort to shift “decision-making away from headquarters 
and closer to affected communities” (BCLTRT, 2014). The BCLTRT’s housing design 
guidelines require that the they homes build are “safe, durable, water and energy 
efficient, and healthy” and include specifications for fire resistance (Austin Community 
Design and Development Center, 2012). Through local decision-making and forward 
thinking construction, the BCLTRT housing recovery program is contributing to a locally 
sustainable rebuilding strategy.  
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Leadership 
A variety of community leaders, 
organizations, businesses, and professionals work 
together to provide the financial support and expertise 
needed to reduce the cost of rebuilding for those with 
the least resources. This is done through local 
donations, grants from national non-governmental 
organizations, and material discounts provided by 
local suppliers. The organization was also able to 
work with local banks to qualify their clients for 
favorable loans to cover material costs. Skilled 
volunteer groups performed all of the construction on 
BCLTRT homes and worked with one local inspector 
to streamline the process.  
The leaders of the BCLTRT were able to 
weave a web of resources together to ensure that the most disadvantaged populations in 
their community were able to return. The organizational diagram provided by the 
BCLTRT describes the step-by-step process the organization goes through to stretch its 
resources efficiently (see Figure 6.2). Case management, construction management, and 
volunteer management teams work together to assess home damage and design an 
appropriate construction strategy to get the applicant back in their home. When additional 
funds are required, the management teams work with an Unmet Needs Table composed 
of local representatives from faith-based organizations, non-profits, and disaster response 
organizations to make up any deficits in the home construction budget.  
 
Figure 6.1:  Bastrop County 
Long Term 
Recovery Team 
Leadership Diagram 
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Figure 6.2: BCLTRT decision-making process diagram (provided by BCLTRT)  
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The leadership model employed by the BCLTRT relies on local community 
leadership, donated resources, and access to expertise in order to conduct a disaster 
recovery housing program outside of the state-run system (see Figure 6.1). The non-profit 
status of the organization provides access to funding sources that may not be available to 
other private or governmental organizations. Without access to federal and state financial 
and administrative resources, the program is necessarily smaller in scope than other state-
run programs, but its local ties enable the organization to reach populations that state-run 
programs could not.   
Resilience 
The BCLTRT has been widely recognized in the community as essential to the 
recovery process and is working to put reactivation procedures in place that will enable it 
to respond to future disasters. Agreements with local businesses, banks, suppliers, and 
agencies will facilitate a quick remobilization of the organization to manage donations 
and volunteers in the event of another disaster. Despite the organization’s apparent 
permanence in the community and established capacity to conduct local recovery 
activities, they continue to operate completely separate from the GLO and are unable to 
access state and federal government recovery resources.  
Other disasters experienced in the region since the establishment of the BCLTRT 
have benefitted from the expertise they have grown through their program. When the City 
of Austin, located 31 miles northwest of Bastrop, experienced flooding in October of 
2013, the BCLTRT was contacted to provide assistance with volunteer management. The 
organization was able to build from lessons learned in Bastrop and provide best practices 
recommendations to organizers on the ground in Austin.  
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The continued presence of this organization in the Bastrop community improves 
the overall capacity for management of future recovery activities at the local level and, to 
some extent, the regional level. This model relies heavily on horizontal ties across the 
community, but has not established substantial vertical integration with state or federal 
activities. As described by Berke, et al., horizontal integration strengthens relationships at 
the community level, while vertical integration is necessary to develop relationship across 
levels of government and external organizations (P. R. Berke et al., 1993). This weakness 
in vertical relationships could limit access to larger pools of resources and knowledge 
available at higher levels of government in future disaster events.  
6.2  BASTROP GENERAL LAND OFFICE HOUSING RECOVERY PROGRAM 
History  
The wildfires struck just as the GLO took over administration of federal and state 
disaster recovery resources. The GLO did not get involved in the wildfire housing 
recovery effort until funds were made available through HUD. The State of Texas 
received over $31 million for housing and non-housing wildfire recovery activities 
statewide. Information from the HUD Needs Assessment led the GLO to determine 
housing assistance was most needed in Bastrop County due to the limited housing 
damage in other impacted counties (Texas General Land Office, 2013). Initially 
$19,042,369 was allocated for housing assistance in Bastrop County, however this 
amount was significantly reduced following reevaluation of unmet infrastructure needs in 
the county (Texas General Land Office, 2013).  
Despite local recovery efforts already underway, the GLO determined the local 
capacity to conduct a larger federally funded recovery program was not available. The 
agency decided to conduct a state run program rather than distributing funds to local 
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agencies. Environmental conditions were expected to complicate the rebuilding process 
and the administrative costs associated with federal funding often overwhelm local 
governments and organizations.  
The agency began accepting applications for its program nearly one year 
following the fire with the number of applicants expected to be in the thousands. When 
the time came, only 210 applications were received for their rehabilitation and 
reconstruction housing program, of which only 28 were determined to be eligible for the 
program and willing to participate (Texas General Land Office, 2014b). Many applicants 
had already received small amounts of assistance over the year since the disaster, but lack 
of clarity in spending requirements meant that many recipients spent the funds they 
received in ways that made them ineligible for receiving future assistance.  
The agency actively promoted the program in the community through mailed 
letters, flyers on doors, and announcements through local schools and service 
organizations to no avail. The lack of interest by the community was understood by 
program leaders to be the result of recovery needs already being met through other 
means. Without someone on the ground or personally involved in the community, the 
agency was unable to connect with and gain the trust of local residents and thusly was 
unable to provide housing assistance to them.  
Recovery 
Recovery is identified by the organization as putting back in place what existed 
before the disaster as efficiently and effectively as possible. Because of its tie to federal 
funding, much of the GLO’s mission is dedicated to fulfilling the administrative duties 
outlined in the requirements for CDBG-DR assistance. The program requires that 
activities funded through the grants meet one of three national objectives: (1) benefiting 
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low- and moderate-income persons; (2) preventing or eliminating blight; or (3) meeting 
other urgent community development needs that pose immediate threats to health or 
welfare of the community (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2002).  
Housing is only a small portion of the work funded by the GLO representing only 
$4,554,900 of the budget (Texas General Land Office, 2013). The program is estimated 
to rebuild or rehabilitate 28 homes for moderate-income homeowners by the spring of 
2014 (Texas General Land Office, 2014b). The majority of the remaining CDBG-DR 
funds are allocated for infrastructure and fire protection projects throughout the county. 
Though the GLO has a mandated mission to affirmatively further fair housing, it was able 
to only minimally meet the housing recovery needs of Bastrop County. A variety of 
factors led to this including an inability to qualify 
applicants, delayed activation of the program, and 
difficulties accessing populations in need throughout 
the county. 
Leadership 
This housing recovery program was 
administered directly by the GLO with CDBG-DR 
funds from HUD (see Figure 6.3). The agency 
developed an Action Plan to establish eligibility 
requirements and a methodology for fund distribution 
(Texas General Land Office, 2013). The required 
citizen participation process consisted of a 7-day 
period where comments on the proposed plan (posted 
on the agency’s website in English and Spanish) were 
 
Figure 6.3:  Bastrop GLO 
Disaster Recovery 
Program Leadership 
Diagram 
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invited by mail, fax, or email. No public comments were actually received in regards to 
the action plan proposed by the GLO.  
The GLO’s organizational chart was included in the Action Plan and outlines the 
chain of command for the disaster recovery program’s operations and public affairs, 
program oversight, and finance and compliance departments (see Figure 6.4). Each 
department has individuals responsible for management and oversight of individual 
aspects of the program and utilizes its own project management system. Enhancements to 
the program are made as needed to improve efficiency. The organizational chart does not 
include space for input from local organizations or other levels of government to inform 
the recovery process. The isolation of this program has contributed very little to the 
horizontal and vertical integration of the GLO into the larger landscape of disaster 
recovery activities in the state.  
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Figure 6.4:  Bastrop GLO Disaster Recovery Program Organizational Chart (adapted 
from Texas General Land Office, 2013) 
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Resilience  
The GLO identifies itself as the primary agency statewide for disaster recovery 
program administration for the foreseeable future. According to a program specialist at 
the agency, there is currently an effort to document program activities within one 
management system for easier coordination and future reference. A ‘Book of Knowledge’ 
will be made available through the agency’s website, which will provide best practices 
for communities disaster recovery activities in the future. This documentation process is 
an effort to retain the institutional disaster recovery expertise the agency has developed 
over the years, which could otherwise be lost with staff turn over or political 
reconfiguration of the agency. This tool would be most useful were strong vertical 
integration across multiple levels of government and organizations is present.   
6.3  LOWER RIO GRANDE VALLEY DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL HOUSING RECOVERY 
PROGRAM 
History  
The GLO began administering the state’s disaster recovery programs three years 
after Hurricanes Ike and Dolly struck. The state had already received one round of 
CDBG-DR funds and was in the process of administering round two when the fair 
housing complaint was filed. As discussed previously, this complaint resulted in a 
conciliation agreement to ensure the disaster recovery programs affirmatively furthered 
fair housing.  
Numerous commissions and legislation passed in the years following Hurricanes 
Ike and Dolly support a model of recovery that favors local level decision-making where 
the administrative capacity is available. In accordance with this desire, the COG for 
impacted areas were designated as the lead agency in distribution of CDBG-DR funds 
received by the State of Texas for Hurricanes Ike and Dolly. The COGs are responsible 
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for administering funds for non-housing and housing programs after conducting a needs 
assessment and making a plan for distribution, all of which are approved by the GLO. 
Ideally, these agencies work with local government officials and community 
organizations to identify recovery needs and design a program to suit the community.  
The LRGVDC is the COG for Hidalgo, Willacy, and Cameron Counties in the 
southernmost tip of Texas. The LRGVDC was established in 1967 and serves as the link 
between federal and state programs and the local units of governments it encompasses 
(Lower Rio Grande Valley Development Council, 2014b). It is “considered the 
appropriate body to ensure coordination of development programs and to ensure local 
control of federal and state funded projects” (Lower Rio Grande Valley Development 
Council, 2014d). The LRGVDC is administering a $122,000,000 disaster recovery 
housing program across their region. This regional approach is intended to ensure 
housing needs are met, achieve economies of scale, ensure administrative consistency, 
and build organizational capacity (Lower Rio Grande Valley Development Council, 
2014d).     
Recovery 
According to the LRGVDC’s website, the primary goal of the disaster recovery 
program is to provide “decent, safe, and sanitary housing” to areas impacted by 
Hurricanes Ike and Dolly. The second and third objectives being to ensure the needs of 
very low, low, and moderate-income households are met in proportion to their percentage 
in the impacted area and to provide housing choice to elderly and disabled populations 
(Lower Rio Grande Valley Development Council, 2014a). In several documents 
describing the recovery program, the LRGDVC identifies their intention to comply with 
the fair housing requirements laid out in the conciliation agreement, but it is not 
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presented as the primary goal of the program. The intentions of the development council 
are largely focused on spending of the CDBG-DR funds available in accordance with the 
GLO requirements.   
The current round of the program began in October of 2012 and has completed 
147 homes with 225 under construction as of April, 2014 (Lower Rio Grande Valley 
Development Council, 2014c). Of the 935 applications received, 833 have been deemed 
eligible for assistance through the program, and 436 have actually received awards for 
assistance. Anecdotes from the field identify break points in the outreach and 
communication strategies employed in the program that may have contributed to lower 
numbers of eligibility than expected (Lower Rio Grande Valley Development Council, 
2011). It is also noted by several activists that 
numerous potential clients across the region are very 
distrustful of the government agency, keeping them 
from considering even applying to the program.  
Leadership 
The GLO, LRGVDC, and private contractors 
make up the leadership group of this disaster 
recovery program (see Figure 6.5). Due to 
“LRGVDC’s lack of experience in developing and 
administering housing programs, coupled with 
difficulties in accurately identifying housing need 
related to the hurricane” the LRGVDC chose to hire 
it’s own consultants and staff to “develop the 
organizational capacity necessary to develop 
 
Figure 6.5:  LRGVDC Disaster 
Recovery Program 
Leadership Diagram 
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appropriate housing programs for the region” (Lower Rio Grande Valley Development 
Council, 2010). In addition to these contractors, the GLO holds contracts with several 
for-profit private contractors to act as grant administrators, manage outreach, and serve as 
outreach counselors for the LRGVDC program. Two of these third-party administrators 
are the URS Corporation and Horne LLP. URS identifies itself as “a leading provider of 
engineering, construction, and technical service for public agencies and private sector 
companies around the world” (URS Corporation, 2014). Horne is an accounting and 
business advisory firm at heart, but has developed a specialty in administering CDBG-
DR funding, disaster recovery housing program management, financial oversight, and 
grant reporting requirements (Horne LLP, 2014)  
The LRGVDC and its contractors operate under the GLO and its contractors as 
the local administrators of program activities. The web of contracts involved in this 
program makes for an opaque chain of responsibility from the outside and, in some 
instances, even from the inside. The LRGVDC’s process flow chart has been color-coded 
in Figure 6.6 in order to deconstruct the chain of decision-makers, but this only raises 
further questions about which entity is responsible for what step in the recovery program. 
The LRGVDC works within this system to manage the day-to-day operation of the 
program and actually carry out the construction activities through their own third-party 
contracts.  
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Figure 6.6:  LRGVDC Process Flow Chart (provided by CDCB) 
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The LRGVDC has a long history of conducting regional planning and emergency 
management activities across the region (Lower Rio Grande Valley Development 
Council, 2014b). This has enabled them to build administrative capacity and relationships 
with local private and non-profit organizations providing similar services in the 
individual communities. Ideally these experiences are able to transfer to the LRGVDC’s 
ability to conduct this recovery program, but a representative from the organization 
expressed frustration that the multiple contracts held by the GLO above them makes for a 
more complicated process than necessary.  
Resilience 
Though the LRGVDC’s long history of project management should make it 
capable of managing the recovery process more independently from the state, as was 
intended by past legislation, this opportunity is not fully leveraged in the current recovery 
program. This desire for more local control at the level of the COG comes from the 
assumption that they have already been working in the region and have established 
relationships with their own contractors to make up any deficits in the organization’s 
individual abilities. The multiple contracts held outside of the LRGVDC has limited their 
control of the program and reduced their ability to build a local reserve of contractors. 
Overall the program has contributed to modest increases in vertical integration between 
the COG and the state and was somewhat able to leverage the pre-existing horizontal 
integration of the COG on a regional level. The LRGVDC sees itself as the ideal 
candidate to manage future recovery programs that are even more integrated with their 
daily infrastructure and development activities.  
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6.4  RIO GRANDE VALLEY RAPID HOUSING RECOVERY PILOT PROGRAM 
History 
After observing the slow and inadequate response at all levels of government to 
Hurricanes Ike and Dolly, the Texas Legislature created the Natural Disaster Housing 
Reconstruction Advisory Committee to develop a natural disaster housing reconstruction 
plan (Lucio, 2009). This reconstruction plan was developed to provide guidance for a 
Housing Reconstruction Demonstration Pilot Program to “test the feasibility of 
implementing the plan for the large-scale production of replacement housing for victims 
of federally declared natural disaster” (Natural Disaster Housing Reconstruction 
Advisory Committee, 2010). The pilot program consists of building twenty homes in 
three pilot areas, Harris County, Galveston County, and the LRGVDC region with 
$2,000,000 set aside for each area. The LRGVDC program is the only one currently 
being implemented.  
The Rio Grande Valley Rapid Housing Recovery Pilot Program, known locally as 
RAPIDO, is funded by the same CDBG-DR funds allocated to the LRGVDC by the 
GLO. Though the body of the program is designed and administered by a local 
organization, CDCB, they are still under the supervision of the LRGVDC and the GLO’s 
administrative contractors. The exact relationship between the LRGVDC, GLO, 
contractors, and the pilot program is unclear to program administrators and is not clearly 
documented by the GLO. Despite this lack of clarity, CDCB is committed to creating a 
replicable housing recovery process flexible enough to allow for local adaptation across 
the state (Community Development Corporation of Brownsville, 2014). 
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Recovery 
The lead organizations see this recovery effort as an opportunity to improve the 
living conditions of the region’s most disadvantaged populations and build their capacity 
to recover from future disasters. The intention of the organization’s involvement in this 
recovery effort is to be able to build a stronger, more prepared, and more resilient 
community. Leaders participating in the program identify their motivations as a moral 
obligation to help members of their community as effectively as they can with the 
resources available. The recovery program is seen by leaders of the CDCB its partner 
organizations as a continuation of the advocacy and service provision roles they already 
play in the community.  
Leadership 
The Community Development Corporation of 
Brownsville is a non-profit community housing 
development organization based in Brownsville 
(Cameron County). The organization was founded in 
1974 and identifies itself as a “multi-faceted affordable 
housing organization devoted to utilizing collaborative 
partnerships to create sustainable communities across 
the Rio Grande Valley through quality education, 
model financing, efficient home design, and superior 
construction” (Community Development Corporation 
of Brownsville, 2011). The organization strives to 
provide homeownership opportunities to the lowest 
income groups in their region. 
 
Figure 6.7:  RAPIDO 
Leadership 
Diagram 
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After 40 years of providing affordable housing programs and loans to the 
community, the organization has built lasting relationships with local community 
organizers, designers, and institutions and has widely established trust in the community. 
These relationships enable them to pull from various bodies of knowledge available in 
the community to design and implement RAPIDO. Leaders from the organization 
emphasize the advantage of the collaborative nature of their program to pull from the best 
models for organizing, development, and design (see Figure 6.7). The strong horizontal 
integration of the CDCB within the larger community is apparent in how program 
administrative roles are identified (see Figure 6.8). Local experts who are already active 
in the community fill each role. By participating in this program local organizations are 
strengthening their ties and capacity to administer future recovery programs.  
 
Figure 6.8:  RAPIDO Role Diagram (provided by CDCB) 
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Resilience 
According to documents produced by CDCB “RAPIDO is understanding, and re-
designing the entire [disaster recovery] process with the people that are impacted most.” 
This community-based approach is reliant on a productive mix of resources (state CDBG-
DR funding), community organizing capacity (provided by local advocacy groups), 
community development capacity (the core mission of CDCB), and innovative design 
and construction expertise (provided by local architects and contractors). These 
collaborations have also enabled the program to reach populations that otherwise would 
not consider seeking government assistance.  
The long-standing reputations of the organizations involved in the community 
enables RAPIDO to gain the trust of individuals who had intentionally abstained from the 
LRGVDC program previously discussed. Coordination of this recovery program has built 
upon and built up pre-existing and new relationships across multiple levels of 
government, non-profit, and private organizations. Though the program is only half way 
through its roughly one year timeline, it has already strengthened both the horizontal and 
vertical integration of the entities involved.     
Each of the case study programs had a unique history, definition of recovery, 
leadership structure, and impact on resilience in the community they operated in. A 
summary of these programs is provided in Figure 6.9. The implications of each program 
are discussed in the following section along with recommendations for leadership models 
in future disaster recovery programs.  
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 BCLTRT Bastrop GLO 
History: Emerged after the disaster Established before the disaster 
Recovery: Everyone can return, rebuild 
economy and neighborhoods better 
than before 
Rebuild what existed before the 
disaster and meet requirements for 
CDBG-DR grant 
Leadership: Local decision-making model that 
relies on local community 
leadership, donated resources, and 
access to expertise  
State agency makes decisions 
Resilience: Increase horizontal integration; no 
change in vertical integration  
No change in horizontal or vertical 
integration 
 LRGVDC RAPIDO 
History: Established before the disaster, but 
no previous experience with 
housing programs or disaster 
recovery 
Established before the disaster and 
previous experience with housing 
programs 
Recovery: Provide decent, safe, and sanitary 
housing and meet requirements for 
CDBG-DR grant 
Improve living conditions for most 
disadvantaged residents 
Leadership: Multiple decision-makers at state 
and local level with a web of third-
party contractors 
Local community organization is lead 
decision-maker with state and local 
government agencies and their third-
party contractors  
Resilience: Little increase in horizontal 
integration; increase in vertical 
integration  
Increase in horizontal and vertical 
integration 
Figure 6.9:  Case Study Program Summary 
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Chapter 7: The Future of Disaster Recovery in Texas 
The disaster recovery programs discussed in this report provide a glimpse into the 
multitude of leadership approaches currently employed across the state. The programs 
from Bastrop represent the most extreme ends of the spectrum with the GLO program 
being primarily led by the state and the BCLTRT being primarily led by a local non-
profit. These two programs operated completely independently from each other resulting 
in a missed opportunity to vertically integrate the efforts across the impacted area. The 
GLO program would have benefited greatly from the close community ties the BCLTRT 
was able to grow, while the BCLTRT would have benefited from the larger pool of 
resources and grant management capacity available at the GLO.  
The programs in the Lower Rio Grande Valley region were more similar, but still 
represent two distinct approaches to recovery leadership. Because both programs operate 
under the GLO and its contractors, both programs suffer from the complicated web of 
consultants involved. The LRGVDC program is able to operate sufficiently within pre-
established vertical and horizontal relationships, but is somewhat limited in opportunities 
to grow capacity that would expand this integration. The Rio Grande Valley Rapid 
Housing Recovery Pilot Program’s (RAPIDO) association with an established affordable 
housing provider, CDCB, greatly expands the program’s capacity through the 
organization’s growing horizontal networks.  
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Figure 7.1:  Case Study Leadership Models Summary 
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Each program’s leadership structure is summarized in Figure 7.1 along with how 
they fit in with this report’s previous discussion about program administration and 
leadership models. Overall, these diagrams reveal a clear advantage of the RAPIDO 
program in being able to engage private, public, and non-profit organizations across 
multiple scales of government and organization. Though the program is designed as a 
small demonstration program, the potential expansion of this model could provide more 
productive pathways for resource distribution from the federal to the local level. These 
pathways would include access by local entities to the resources and capacities they lack 
as well as opportunities for higher levels of government to target more locally appropriate 
resource distribution agents. In order for this type of model to be replicated else where, 
organizational capacity must exist at the local level.   
To improve current models of disaster recovery across the state, future legislation 
should: (1) support opportunities to develop vertical relationships across multiple levels 
of government; (2) support leadership of existing organizations already providing 
services in communities impacted by disaster; and (3) support opportunities to expand the 
capacity of local leaders to administer recovery activities. These actions will grow the 
vertical and horizontal integration of public, private, and non-profit organizations across 
the state and improve capacity to conduct efficient and effective future recovery 
programs.  
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Appendix A: Semi-structured Interview Protocol 
Before interview: 
• Ask interviewee for any diagrams or flow charts that represent their program’s 
decision-making processes or ‘chain-of-command’ for distributing program services 
and resources. Should include:   
o Who participates in decisions about the housing program  
o What steps are taken in making program decisions 
o Who receives services  
o How are those services determined  
o What kind of timeline is involved in administering recovery services to 
disaster survivors  
• Review published program information about general organization history, history of 
their involvement in disaster recovery, and what they identify as their goals and 
accomplishments  
Interview Questions:  
 Question Sub-question Intent 
1. Why is your 
organization 
engaged in 
disaster 
recovery? 
 
 
When did your 
organization get 
involved?  
Has your organization 
been involved in 
disaster recovery in the 
past? 
Will it be involved in 
disaster recovery in the 
future?  
 
Identify who/what is at the center of 
the mission for the organization 
Provides insight into the motivations 
behind the organization’s existence 
and their core-values 
2.  What does 
recovery look 
like to your 
organization? 
What are the goals 
identified?  
What is the time frame?  
What is the spatial & 
How the organization defines recovery 
may impact who they think should 
make decisions in program operations 
and how they distribute the resources 
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 social scope of 
recovery?  
they have  
May also provide insight into how 
their recovery activities will impact 
future resiliency of the community 
they serve; does their definition of 
recovery include building capacity?  
 
3. Who are the 
recipients of 
your services?  
 
Who is hard to 
serve? 
 
What is the geographic 
scope of the program? 
(Is there a particular 
neighborhood you work 
in?) 
 
Helps to determine what social unit & 
geographic scale is being considered; 
individuals/families/groups/neighborh
ood/ city/region 
 
4. How are 
decisions made 
about your 
program and 
how do services 
get to 
individuals you 
serve? 
 
How does your 
organization fit within 
the larger context of 
recovery efforts in the 
community or across 
the state? 
Determine who participates in 
decisions about program priorities and 
operation  
Do certain organizational structures 
align with certain priorities and types 
of knowledge?  
Are there structures that are more 
concerned with resiliency than others?  
5. What barriers 
have you or 
your 
organization 
faced in 
implementing 
your program?  
 
 
What are the 
perceptions of the 
program in the 
community?  
Do you encounter 
perceptions of past 
programs in the 
community? 
Who have you turned to 
in order to overcome 
any barriers?  
 
Answers to these questions may 
provide more insight into who/what 
are perceived as problem makers and 
problem solvers  
Indicates what views and knowledge is 
considered valuable or troublesome  
6.  What are the 
specific goals of 
your housing 
program?  
 
What do you see 
for the future of 
the community 
Opportunity to build off 
discussions about the 
organizational structure 
to identify explicit and 
underlying goals of the 
program 
Are there secondary 
effects of the disaster 
The diagramming question may have 
brought up goals that were not 
mentioned earlier 
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you serve?  the program is 
addressing or are goals 
mostly aligned with 
primary impacts of the 
disaster?    
 
7. How are 
successes of the 
program 
measured?  
Quantity or quality of 
services?  
Who defines these 
measures?  
Who measures success?  
Are there any conflicts between how 
the organization defines recovery and 
how it is measuring its own impacts? 
Some programs may have to answer to 
metrics set by funders or governmental 
agencies, which may conflict with the 
values of the organization or the 
culture of the community  
 
8. What are the 
achievements of 
the program so 
far?  
What are you most 
proud of in your work 
with the program?  
What is the program 
most recognized for in 
the community?  
 
Are descriptions of achievements 
divergent from the measures and goals 
described?  
This may actually be a better indicator 
of organizational values 
9. What have I not asked you that you think is important in understanding your 
organization?  
 
10. Who else should I talk to?  
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